Abstract-There has been recent interest in the development of untethered sensor nodes that communicate directionally via free space optical communications for mission critical settings in which high-speed link guarantees in hostile environments are needed. Directional wireless optical sensor networks have the potential to provide gigabits per second speeds for relatively low power consumption enabling bursty traffic and longer network lifetimes. In randomly deployed sensor settings, the crucial steps of ad hoc route setup and node localization are not only nontrivial, but also vulnerable to security attacks. In response to these challenges, this paper proposes a lightweight securityaware integrated routing and localization approach that exploits the benefits of link directionality inherent to wireless optical sensor networks. The circuit-based algorithm that makes use of directional routing loops, called SIRLoS, leverages the resources of the base station and a hierarchical network structure to identify topological information and detect security violations in neighborhood discovery and routing mechanisms. We study the performance of the SIRLoS algorithm demonstrating that reduced localization error, routing overhead, and likelihood of attack in various contexts are possible within lightweight computational constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE LAST few decades has seen a substantial transformation of wireless networking technologies leading to the recent interest in the integration of computation, communications and sensing mechanisms for low cost untethered device development. There is currently also an active interest in enabling a tighter coupling of this sensor networking technology to the physical world through actuation. This would lead to numerous new applications including smart vehicles, autonomous disaster exploration, and the surveillance and control of critical infrastructure. In such life-critical contexts designing for safety often translates to ensuring communication system security and device "awareness". For example, in disaster exploration, autonomous agents must have the ability to acquire and transmit sensed multimedia data such as temperature and video signals as well as identify their location in order to provide essential information to first responders.
Research in mission critical networks (MCNs) addresses such challenges through the development of mechanisms that promote specialized networks that are adaptable, ultradependable and secure in the face of adverse conditions. In some contexts, these networks are comprised of smallsized wireless battery-operated nodes that are randomly and rapidly deployed. Such characteristics are essential for system operation, but their untethered nature and resource limitations pose power and bandwdith challenges. In addition, without adequate security design, these ad hoc networks are vulnerable to attacks including passive eavesdropping, denial-of-service (DoS) and data and node corruption [1] easily leading to catastrophe in safety-critical situations.
A. Directional Optical Mission Critical Networks
There has recently been a push toward the development of directional communication paradigms for ad hoc networking [2] , [3] . In contrast to traditional omnidirectional radio frequency (RF) communications, directional RF antennas and broad beam or scanning free space optical (FSO) laser technologies provide higher bandwidths, longer communication ranges and smaller transmission footprints to aid security. Nodes employing free space optics, in comparison to RF, have the advantage of smaller size (for greater agility), power conservation (orders of magnitude better) and gigabits per second speeds suitable for broadband multimedia transmission. These capabilities are imperative to provide multimodal surveillance guarantees and to handle bursty traffic for effective decisionmaking in mission critical settings. By focusing light in one direction, reduced multi-path interference and greater spatial reuse over conventional RF communication is possible. However, it is necessary to account for atmospheric effects and line-of-sight necessities of the laser beam at both the data link and networking levels [4] , [5] , [6] . Table I summarizes some differences between conventional omnidirectional RF and FSO sensor node technologies [7] , [4] , [8] , [9] , [5] , [10] . As witnessed by the popularity of the Smart Dust mote [4] , [10] , the use of wireless optical communications requires welcome paradigm shifts in network design for safety-critical applications. We refer to such communication systems as directional optical mission critical networks (DOMCNs).
Surveillance of critical infrastructure, for example, is a safety-critical application that relies heavily on the ability of arbitrarily positioned nodes to securely gain knowledge of their location and to establish secure ad hoc routing mechanisms to identify, track and communicate vital data such as the presence of danger. Given the possibly harsh communication environment as well as the heterogeneity of nodes with varying degrees of size and communication capability, it is often imperative that sensor nodes have multiple modes of data 0733 -8716/10/$25.00 c 2010 IEEE [11] . In some contexts, omnidirectional communication is employed for communicating control signals while directional transmission is employed for bursty high bandwidth acquired data [2] . It has been demonstrated how a significant majority of links in DOMCNs based on ad hoc networking models such as [4] , [10] , [12] are directional by nature (i.e., communications over a link is unidirectional, not bidirectional) and thus cannot be ignored. This makes neighborhood discovery, routing and localization mechanisms developed for traditional omnidirectional RF networks [13] (primarily based on reverse path routing approaches) inapplicable. Furthermore, the resource constraints of the nodes impedes the use of global positioning systems and costly security primitives based on asymmetric cryptography. It is therefore imperative that the feasibility of an integrated and low-cost routing and localization scheme for DOMCNs be studied.
B. Related Work
Recently, a number of routing protocols have been proposed for lightweight ad hoc networks [14] . These approaches attempt to minimize energy usage for routing while maximizing network lifetime. Protocols such as TinyOS, MCFA, SPINS, GEAR, SAR, Rumor Routing and Directed Diffusion, intended for multihop ad hoc networking, use various optimization considerations including data aggregations, data dissemination latency and energy dissipation. These traditional ad hoc routing approaches apply to bidirectional-link networks and are fundamentally based on a reverse-path routing paradigm that is incompatible with the (non-reversible) directional links present in DOMCNs.
A simple and efficient solution for dealing with networks with some unidirectional links is called tunneling [15] , in which bidirectionality is emulated for a unidirectional link by using a multihop reverse backchannel consisting of bidirectional links to establish the tunnel. However, because of its high overhead [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] tunneling is inappropriate for DOMCNs in which a significant proportion of links are unidirectional. As discussed in [15] , designing a routing paradigm from scratch for DOMCNs, in contrast to modifying existing routing protocols, is the most desirable alternative.
For unidirectional link optical wireless networks, two main routing paradigms exist: broadcast-gather [10] , [21] and circuit-based [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] ; the latter is the focus of this paper. The broadcast-gather approach has been shown to be inefficient in contrast to circuit paradigms [22] , [23] because uplink and downlink communications are accounted for separately, and it does not account for security. The circuitbased routing paradigm enables bidirectional communications amongst nodes with unidirectional links by using distinct paths to and from sender and receiver nodes. This results in bidirectional communications occurring along a circuit (a closed multihop loop originating and terminating at the same node). However, prior circuit-based research has not addressed the localization issue. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first secure integrated routing and localization scheme for directional optical link networks.
C. Contributions and Organization of this Paper
This paper presents SIRLoS, a novel lightweight secure integrated routing and localization scheme for DOMCNs. In order to conserve power, size and cost, SIRLoS does not make use of expensive range estimation methods, time synchronization or localization hardware. Instead the SIRLoS approach exploits a hierarchical cluster-based organization of the network to offer: (1) a circuit-based neighborhood discovery and routing approach; (2) a practical location estimation algorithm that exploits topology control mechanisms; and (3) lightweight security services based on symmetric cryptography and that leverage the base station. SIRLoS guarantees that routing and location information are protected against eavesdropping and unauthorized manipulation, while providing broadcast authentication, data confidentiality, integrity and freshness. We demonstrate the security benefits of link directionality in SIRLoS and provide performance evaluations as well as attack and security analysis to demonstrate its potential in MCN applications.
Section II introduces the DOMCN architecture, threat model and security assumptions. Section III details the SIRLoS approach highlighting the lightweight design characteristics. Security and performance analysis are presented in Section IV followed by final remarks in Section V.
II. NETWORK MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. The Directional Mission Critical Network
It is assumed that n DOMCN nodes are randomly and densely deployed with uniform distribution in a planar twodimensional region A. The set of n nodes are denoted S n = {s i : i = 1, 2, · · · n} with each node s i having an equal and independent likelihood of falling at any coordinate location Υ i = xi yi ∈ A and facing a random orientation Θ i ∼ Uniform[0, 2π) with respect to a common reference axis (e.g., pointing north) as shown in Figure 1(a) . We denote
Each node is equipped with a directional broad beamed FSO transmitter of communication range r (in units of km) and a beamwidth of α (in units of radians unless otherwise stated) whose center points in the direction of the node's orientation θ i . As depicted in Figure 1 to s j (denoted s i → s j ) if and only if Υ j ∈ Φ i . However, s j can only transmit to s i via a directed multihop reverse route (denoted s i s j ), with other nodes acting as routers (unless of course Υ i ∈ Φ j , resulting in the bidirectional link s i s j ). Naturally, in discovering a multihop reverse path, the notion of a circuit [27] (a closed multihop loop originating and terminating at the same node) results, and serves as the fundamental mechanism for bidirectional communications in DOMCNs [28] .
This idealized model provides a opportune way to link device level parameters to large-scale network behavior. It also models the well known class of Smart Dust FSO sensor networks [4] providing a theoretical platform to design networking algorithms. Moreover, the parameter α conveniently controls the proportion of unidirectional to bidirectional network links, where as α → 2π the network approaches a random geometric graph (RGG) model commonly employed to analyze omnidirectional RF networks; this provides a framework for comparing the ad hoc networking properties when omnidirectional and directional physical layer transmissions are employed to better assess applicability to various mission critical settings.
In an ad hoc network, the base station (denoted BS) gathers critical information from the sensors and transmits queries or control information to the sensor nodes. For scalability and improved connectivity [12] a hierarchical network structure is created that involves communication of the sensor nodes to the base station via cluster heads (CHs) that have bidirectional links to the base station. In hybrid sensor networks, CH communications can be achieved via omnidirectional RF transmissions. In all-optical wireless networks, hardware such as passive corner cube retroreflectors (CCRs) can establish bidirectional links with the base station without significantly depleting energy [4] . Typically, CHs are gateway nodes that send/receive data directly to/from the BS on behalf of other nodes in their associated clusters. We denote the set of CH nodes by CH, and mark a node s k ∈ CH with a superscript asterisk to give s * k . The fundamental type of circuit used for communications in the DOMCN is known as a BS-circuit illustrated in Figure 1(b) , which is a circuit that necessarily includes the BS; all non-base station nodes in the BS-circuit are said to be in the same cluster. An uplink path to the BS and downlink path from the BS for every node in a BS-circuit (or cluster) exists. For example, in Figure 1( Figure 1 (b).
The random directed n-node graph G n (S n , E) representing the DOMCN consists of a vertex node set S n and an edge set E. The edges are represented via an n × n adjacency matrix where E(i, j) 1≤i,j≤n = 1 if Υ j ∈ Φ i or 0 otherwise indicating that the edge s i → s j , does or does not exist, respectively. We define E(i, i) = 0 to prevent self loops. The graph G n (S n , E), defined by parameters (n, r, α), is called a random sector graph (RSG) [10] and converges to the traditional RGG model of ad hoc networks for α = 2π. A significant distinction with the RSG model is that two distinct sets of neighbors must be defined for each node s i : the set S i =: {s k }, ∀k : E(i, k) = 1 consisting of s i 's successors, and the set P i =: {s h }, ∀h : E(h, i) = 1 consisting of s i 's predecessors. In omnidirectional networks, popularly modeled as RGGs, such distinction between successors and predecessors does not exist because links are bidirectional. To aid in scalability and connectivity, by definition, a virtual bidirectional grid connects all CHs via the BS so that
B. Threat Model
In safety-critical settings, guaranteeing a high degree of undisrupted information flow, upon which vital decisions are made, is essential. SIRLoS is a network-level protocol, so the threat model considered in this paper is focused on routingmessage and routing-operation attacks during neighborhood discovery and route setup . Given the high degree of collaboration during networking, deliberate efforts to breach routing security may cause catastrophic DoS [1] . Within this class of routing attacks, we consider the common two categories of oustider attacks, in which the opponent possesses no special access to the network resources and cryptographic keying information, and insider attacks, in which a motivated opponent compromises (via physical or remote exploitation) a subset of authentic nodes, gaining access to secret cryptographic materials and hence already having entry into exclusive network resources.
The most common outsider attacks on routing data include passive eavesdropping, where an attacker attempts to glean information on traffic flows in order to conduct traffic analysis for devastating future attacks, and active injection and replaying of false routing packets in order to disrupt information flow. As we will demonstrate, practical lightweight cryptographic approaches may be used in order to combat these problems.
For insider attacks modeled in this paper, the opponent is limited by the hardware restrictions of the corrupted node; hence, an attacker has the same capabilities as any other node, albeit the resources may be harnessed to maximize damage. Because there is a large variability the execution of an insider attack, measuring the degree of associated network debilitation is not a tractable approach to characterizing the robustness or security of DOMCNs. Given that such an attack is unwanted in general, we assert that a better approach is to measure the difficulty for an opponent to successfully achieve a given form of insider attack and to go undetected.
C. Assumptions
As is convention, the base station is assumed to be a resource-rich, powerful, location-aware and trusted entity that cannot be compromised. In a disaster exploration situation, the BS may, for example, be set up prior to first responder action or may be placed on a stationary medical aid vehicle. Each node s i is uniquely identified by its name and is aware of a preset positive integer δ representing the maximum hop count and its orientation Θ i (by employing an inexpensive compass); the values of r and α are selected to satisfy connectivity constraints [12] .
Each node s i is pre-deployed with a unique individual key K i and password P W i it shares only with the BS, and with a network-wide key K N shared with all entities, which are each 64-bit random values; symmetric key security primitives using K i , P W i , and K N are employed. We denote A|B as the concatenation of message A with message B if both messages emanate from the same node, and A||B otherwise, while
and M AC K {M } respectively denote the encryption, decryption and MAC of message M with key K [29] . Where appropriate, the lightweight RC5 scheme and the HMAC-MD5 algorithm (with a 128-bit authenticator value) are utilized [30] , and the XOR function ⊕ is employed to avoid byte expansion.
It is assumed that s i ∈ CH with probability 0 < p CH < 1 to model arbitrary scattering of CHs in the network. Nodes are not tamper resistant and may be subverted by an attacker with probability 0 < p a < 1.
III. SIRLOS: SECURE INTEGRATED ROUTING AND LOCALIZATION SCHEME A. Off-line Key Setup
The first stage of SIRLoS is off-line key generation performed by the BS and setup performed prior to network deployment. As common, a μ-TESLA [30] inspired approach is leveraged for BS broadcast authentication; however, we do not require time synchronization given our BS-circuit paradigm. Given the resource constraints of each node, asymmetric approaches are considered to be too costly necessitating simple symmetric methods of BS data authentication. Here, the BS pre-computes and stores a length-(E + 1) one-way key chain {K e } for e = 0, 1, . . . , E, by successively applying a known one-way hash function F to a randomly generated initial key K E , so that K e−1 = F (K e ) where e = 1, 2, . . . , E indexes a particular broadcast communications era, and E eras are large enough to span the network's lifetime. The last key of the chain K 0 , known as the commitment, is preloaded into each node. Due to the nature of F , future keys cannot be computed from previous ones. However, it is trivial to verify that a key K e (once revealed) was derived from the committment by simply repeatedly applying F to K e , (e − 1) times (denoted F e−1 (K e )) and verifying that the result equals K 0 . After deployment, keys in {K e } are revealed to nodes by the BS in the reverse order from which they were generated K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K E , yielding an efficient, simple and lightweight mechanism for each node to authenticate BS messages.
B. Secure Neighborhood Discovery
After DOMCN deployment, ad hoc route establishment requires that topology discovery be initiated. Each CH s * a ∈ CH indicates its readiness to begin neighborhood discovery by sending a READY signal to the BS who responds to s * a by generating a unique nonce η a t at the current time t, and initiating a simple challenge-and-respond protocol (CRP) to authenticate s * a employing K a and P W a . The CRP signal also allows the BS to employ a simple range and angular estimation mechanism to determine Υ a [4] . If s * a passes the challenge, the BS sends it a circuit discovery beacon (CDB) containing the CH's position Υ a , marked with η a t and encrypted with K N for onward flooding. The exchange is:
where HT counts the number of hops traveled by the CDB and is thus incremented at every intermediate node. The CDB consists of a 140-bit header with a 4-bit field for HT , an 8-bit field to hold e, and two 64-bit fields for revealing K e and the rolling nonce values, respectively. The payload is variable into which each node s i encountering the CDB appends a 160-bit entry consisting of its 32-bit information vector (8- based on the location of its predecessors, included in the payload of CDBs it receives, by employing the location estimation algorithm described in the following section. If s i ∈ CH, it simply obtains its coordinates from the CDB received from the BS as previously noted above. To detect wormhole-type attacks, a range-and-orientation constraint (ROC) test that we detail in the next section is performed.
Before forwarding the CDB, s i also verifies that HT ≤ δ (i.e., the CDB has not expired), increments HT by one, updates the current nonce η * t+HT in the packet as η *
to the CDB's payload, re-encrypts the new CDB with K N , and then re-broadcasts the updated CDB to its successors. The route discovery task of a CDB with 1 < HT ≤ δ is terminated when it encounters a CH, who closes the BS-circuit by returning the packet to the BS.
A CDB is discarded if HT > δ or if it fails any of the security checks including the ROC test. As a final step, within τ seconds after sending out the CDB, s i broadcasts a low-bit hello packet (HELLO i ) within a communication sector − Assuming all security checks pass at every phase and δ > 3, the above exchange will continue as follows for the first three nodes, s * a , s b and s c , in the BS-circuit of Figure 1 
The protocol differs from standard flooding based neighborhood discovery approaches for omnidirectional ad hoc networks in the following ways. First, routing is circuit-based due to the directionality of links making it necessary for the beacons to be both initiated and terminated at a single network entity, in this case the BS. Second, it is necessary that location and orientation information be provided in the CDB in order for the BS to create a network graph to assess optimal routing and to identify attacks such as wormholes, node identity replication and Sybil [1] , [31] . A successor node can also identify a potential wormhole attack as we describe in the next section.
Furthermore, to keep the protocol overhead lightweight, to avoid byte expansion in the header the ⊕ operation is employed for cheap source authentication. A compromise is that, upon receiving a CDB and testing the nonce field of the header (given by η Figure 1(b) ), a failed test leaves it ambiguous, which of the nodes may not legitimately be part of the network. 
C. Location Estimation and ROC Test
The
Assuming random deployment, the optimal estimate for Υ j in the least square sense is the centroid of Φ g ∩ Φ h ∩ Φ i , which for arbitraryshaped regions is likely to be complex to compute at each sensor.
To provide finer granularity yet be lightweight, the following procedure is employed that leverages the compact transmission footprint of directional communications. After τ seconds of receiving a CDB from s i , s i transmits a HELLO i signal using a transmission range r ; then, s j determines that its location Υ j lies either within the sector ϕ 
If s j has heard thus far m > 1 distinct predecessors, it refines its location estimate as the running average of the centroids of the m pie-shaped sectors within which it falls, given by
where Υ is not the centroid of the overlapping region of the m sectors, but is a practical estimate that does not require complex search and grid score table schemes to obtain the boundary of the overlap region as employed in [32] . Our scheme differs from the triangulation method of [10] (in which each node waits to receive beacons from three known-location predecessors to determine its location), and nodes do not need to perform range estimation or angle-of-arrival measurements, keeping both computational and communication overhead lower.
Once a location estimate is computed, the node s j performs the ROC test as illustrated in Figure 3 ∈ Φ i . The ROC test provides a geometric constraint on the network graph which is exploited as a security check to protect against routing attacks such as wormholes. It is possible that a node involved in a wormhole will fabricate its location to avoid deception, however, this will also cause unwanted effects for the corrupt node. First, because of the unidirectional nature of the links, this fabricated location must first be processed by the BS; if multiple incorrect locations are given to various wormhole neighbors, the node's actions will first be identified by the BS as a potential node replication attack. If only a single incorrect location is sent, then the BS may properly process it and send the data to the node's predecessors during a node routing table update phase; however, this runs the problem of not having any predecessors point their lasers in the correct direction and hence the corrupt node will cut itself off from the network.
D. Base Station Network Topology Reconstruction
The BS reconstructs G n (S n , E ) from the BS-circuit and individual node information available in returned CDBs. First, it validates each CDB received; specifically, the BS verifies (1) that HT equals the number of appended sections in the payload; (2) the claimed identity and per hop entry of each node s i in the CDB by ensuring that its computed M AC Ki {I(s i ) |P W i } is equivalent to the signature entry of the node; (3) the final cumulative path nonce η * t+h included in the CDB for each h-hop path (for the circuit in Figure 1(b) , it verifies that η * t+7 matches η
If any of the security checks fail or the BS observes a discrepancy in the entries of any CDB, that CDB is discarded, and intrusion detection is initiated for the suspected route(s).
Using the validated CDBs, the BS constructs an adjacency matrix E by assuming that a subsequent node in a CDB's payload entry is a successor of the previous node; i.e., if s j 's entry follows that of s i , the BS assumes s i → s j and hence E ij = 1. Once the associated graph is completed, the estimated locations for each node Υ using all of the predecessor data and the locations of the CHs, and a large-scale ROC test on each link of E is performed to determine any wormhole, node identity replication and Sybil attacks. Upon suspicion, further intrusion detection is initiated. At conclusion, links and nodes with unresolved security issues are removed from E leaving a graph of validated nodes.
E. Predecessor and Successor Routing Table Update
The distinction between predecessor and successor neighbors necessitates two routing tables for a node s i . We call these predecessor and successor routing tables denoted PRT(s i ) and SRT(s i ), respectively. Collectively, they are given by
. From E , the BS constructs PRT(s i ) and SRT(s i ) for each s i ; specifically, the PRT(s i ) (or SRT(s i )) consists of each distinct downlink (or uplink) path for s i and its associated cost (in terms of hop count). Route optimizations are then conducted in order to minimize hop count. The BS unicasts the encrypted routing tables
] to s i , who upon receipt, compares the PRT from the BS with its self-registered PRT. Any discrepancy observed in entries triggers suspicion and deletion of the corresponding circuit from PRT(s i ) and a report to the BS. Nodes that receive valid routing tables conclude the neighborhood discovery phase by sending an acknowledgement (ACK) to the BS. The BS queries nodes from which it has not received an ACK within a stipulated time frame.
F. Dynamic Route Setup
Due to link breakage, addition of new nodes, or mobility, it may be necessary to establish routes dynamically. Dynamic route establishment entails a node s i seeking a secure and efficient route to any node s j as needed, by leveraging the BS. Here, s i sends an encrypted route request RREQ(s j ) for s j to the BS, who responds by sending s i the minimum cost path for s i s j , and sending s j the minimum cost RETURN link for s j s i , encrypted with K i and K j respectively. The BS also includes a unique pairwise key K e ij to enable s i and s j to establish a secure communication for a session. In the case of new nodes that may have entered the network, more optimal routes to and from other nodes including the BS may now be possible. For a new node to enter the network it initiates a CDB as detailed in Section III-B; thus the BS has the most updated topology. When a RREQ is sent to the BS from a node s i requesting a more optimal route to s j , an updated minimum cost path can be sent to both s i and s j . More details of dynamic route setup can be found in [33] .
IV. PERFORMANCE, SECURITY AND ATTACK ANALYSIS
We select foundational metrics to assess SIRLoS for accuracy, overhead, and security. Average hop count and localization error are core measures in a directional paradigm; the average hop count provides an indication of the effort required for neighborhood discovery and routing operations that scale with circuit length. In addition to providing critical surveillance data and identifying wormhole type attacks, location information is important for laser pointing and the associated error will impact physical layer system properties related to transmission gain. Novel security analysis is based on the structure of SIRLoS and focuses on the advantages that circuit-based communications provides when the uplink and downlink paths are distinct. Other aspects of network security that are common to general ad hoc networks are not studied here.
We employ MATLAB for empirical studies with α, p CH and r preset, and (unless otherwise stated) n = 300 nodes randomly (with uniform distribution) positioned and oriented in a planar square region of unit area 1 km 2 . As predecessor relationships are derived by reversing successor links, it suffices to populate E by determining successor relationships only. Each simulation scenario is repeated 1000 times, with results averaged to yield statistical confidence within ±1% for parameter ranges for n, r and α that guarantee network connectivity asymptotically almost surely [12] .
The reader should note that although the presented simulations correspond to n = 300, empirical analysis by the authors for n on the order of thousands demonstrates that the approach scales well. Specifically, as n increases the CH density increases providing shorter uplink and downlink paths to the BS as well as lower localization error. As analyzed in [12] , K-connectivity properties are improved providing more network robustness.
A. Average Hop Count
We first observe average hop count HT (computed by averaging the HT values of legitimate CDBs received by the BS) versus α with r set to 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, and 0.25 and a corresponding fraction of CH nodes p CH of 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3. Results are provided in Figure 4 ; as expected HT ≥ 2. If α is fixed, hop count can be reduced to practical levels with an appropriate selection of range r and hierarchy (via selection of p CH ). It appears that r and α have the most significant effects on HT demonstrating that once connectivity is achieved, overhead can be reduced with effective selection of (r, α) related to communication device characteristics. Furthermore, given that HT is effectively the mean circuit length, and on average a node will take half the hops to reach the BS and vice versa, for all settings that we have tested, the multihop nature of the DOMCN does not create significant networking overhead.
B. Localization Error
With p CH set to 0.1, and r varying from 0 through 0.2 km, we run SIRLoS and compute the localization error:
as the mean squared error between the correct and estimated position vectors (initialized to zero) of S n . Figure 5 presents the results showing plots of LE versus r for SIRLoS denoted "S" which performs better, compared with the centroid only [32] method (positions are estimated as the average centroid of the sectors of predecessors) denoted "C", as r increases and α decreases. Observe that as r → 0, LE → (1 − p CH ) (in this case 0.9), since the network is almost surely disconnected at small r values and CHs are the only nodes that determine their positions (accurately) from the BS. Another interesting observation is the 'phase transition' property [27] , (LE transitions rapidly from a maximum to minimum value) which gets more dramatic as α → 2π. As expected, LE improves for larger α and r, as a greater number of predecessors are available for location estimation. In a second experiment, we vary p CH from 0.1 through 0.5 and measure LE for various α, with r = 0.1 km. Figure 5(b) illustrates plots of LE decreasing with increasing p CH and α. Since CHs obtain accurate information of their location directly from the BS, as their proportion within the network increases, the data from which a node can estimate its location becomes more precise yielding a lower LE.
C. Security Analysis
It is straightforward to verify that the integrated security of SIRLoS ensures against outsider attacks such as unauthorized participation in route establishment, spoofed routing signaling, and alteration of routing messages via the lightweight cryptographic mechanisms embedded in the protocol. This section focuses on insider attacks and the fundamental security advantage that a directional paradigm for MCNs provides. We show how the BS verification and uplink-downlink path diversity in SIRLoS provides greater opportunities for network monitoring, increasing the difficulty for a malicious node to control both the forward and reverse flow of the beacon (i.e., with high probability the CDB reaches the BS before returning to a node). This yields security benefits for DOMCNs and provides alerts of intrusion. In the next section, we also analyze attacks aimed at path diversity. It should be noted that uplink and downlink path diversity is also possible in bidirectional paradigms; however, for the most part using distinct communication paths is considered to be inefficient (given that such networks do not possess the advantages that directional networks have at the physical layer) and at least for control signaling (e.g., the sending of ACKs) and protocols, the each link is used bidirectionally if possible.
1) Per Hop Authentication and Alteration of Routing Beacons:
Per hop authentication requires the BS to verify the correct participation of each node claimed in the CDB's payload. Employing the cumulative updating of a unique nonce originally generated by the BS, with each node's passwords, a malicious insider node χ A cannot arbitrarily alter routing information in a CDB without being detected. This distinguishing lightweight node-dependence feature strengthens the cryptographic property of SIRLoS, similar to the dependence structures used in common encryption algorithms. Consider the two possible cases in which χ A hopes to disrupt routing by forging a non-existent route: (1) χ A deletes the entry of one or more of its ancestors (i.e., nodes in its downlink path) from the CDB, and alters the HT value accordingly; (2) χ A inserts false node information in the CDB. In both cases however, without prior knowledge of the original nonce or the impersonated nodes' password and individual key, it is impossible to modify the accumulated nonce value in order to either extract entries to annihilate nodes, or input false entries into the CDB. Furthermore, tampering with the CDB in this way results in the non-verifiability of the final nonce received at the BS, and subsequent discarding of the packet. We have however identified two possible problem cases. a) Problem Case I: In the two attacks enumerated above, χ A may succeed in fooling its descendants (i.e., nodes in its uplink path) into making erroneous entries into their PRTs since the CDB is not verified until it is returned to the BS, prior to which nodes already update their PRTs. However, this falsehood is detected when the BS sends routing tables to each node, who then compares the PRT received from the BS with the one it recorded during neighborhood discovery. As previously stated, inconsistent entries are deleted and reported. 
To analyze this vulnerability, we consider the probability of its likelihood (derived in Appendix A) given by
for large n. Figure 6 presents the results for normalized p χA (> 0 ) to demonstrate the advantages of directed communications; a measure normalized with respect to p a is presented to highlight the dependence on the network graph associated with (n, r, α) instead of on the probability of node corruption p a . The advantages of directional communications in reducing the risk of this vulnerability for α ≈ More general forms of vulnerability, in which a corrupt node hears progressing CDPs two hop counts apart, can be considered. For example, in a three node insider link scenario, if s b → s c , s b → s a and s c → s a all exist, then a potentially corrupt s a can deduce P W b in a similar manner to above. The corresponding analysis is found in [33] , but we do not present it here as similar insights are deduced regarding the advantage of directional communications.
2) Broadcast Authentication and Alien Node Participation: Broadcast authentication ensures that only the BS is able to initiate routing. The CRP and encryption with K N for confidentiality, both serve to prevent outsiders from sniffing the K e and subsequently initiating, spoofing or fabricating CDBs. While {K e } provides initial broadcast authentication (since no other entity can reveal a correct K e to CHs), we observe that, a key, once revealed in the CDB appears exposed to insider attackers. However, this information does not benefit the opponent as nodes do not route data back in the reverse direction from which they first received a CDB, but forward it along a directed path until it inadvertently reaches a CH. Hence, the unique nonce marking all CDBs are eventually validated by the BS identifying wrongful initiations.
D. Attack Analysis
The previous section illustrated the security advantages of path diversity in circuit-based routing. In this section, we focus on attacks that exploit the possibility of certain types of loop configurations to modify routing information sent to the BS during neighborhood discovery.
1) BS-Circuit Collusion Attack:
We introduce a novel attack for DOMCNs termed the BS-circuit collusion attack in which insider nodes collude to place themselves both at the downlink and uplink of a target node s b , thereby breaking the security advantage of the represented BS-circuit. The motivation for this wormhole-type insider attack, as depicted in Figure 7 (a), is to disrupt routing by deciphering P W b , as similarly described in Section IV-C (Problem Case II), and then successfully dropping s b 's entry from any CDB, as illustrated in Figure 7(b) We define the search region Ω a where χ A2 attempts an invasion to be the region delineated by the locus of points at a fixed distance r from Φ a , illustrated as the shaded regions in Figures 8(a) and (b) for α < π and α ≥ π respectively. The probability p ca of χ A2 invading node s c ∈ Φ b given s b ∈ Φ a (derived in Appendix B) is given by:
for n → ∞ where A(·) is the area of the argument twodimensional region,
where the corresponding regions Ω a are shown in Figure 8 . Figure 9 illustrates normalized p ca /p a versus α for r = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2 and 0.25 and n = 300, 1000 and 5000. The results verify the advantage of directional communications in DOMCNs. Clearly for practical values of n = 300, and typical laser beamwidths of α ≈ 2π 9 , there is a significant security gain. As n and r are decreased, there is also less risk of the BS collusion attack since the attacker has fewer degrees of freedom to exploit to apply the attack.
2) Other Attacks on Routing: Other types of routing attacks well known in the literature can be considered for DOMCNs, but they fundamentally are not applicable due to the lack of bidirectional links. The interested reader is referred to [23] , [25] for further details.
A particularly devastating outsider attack that does apply to DOMCNs is the wormhole, which has been widely studied for omnidirectional ad hoc networks [1] , [34] , [32] . Aimed at disrupting routing, a low metric route is established between two network locations through which the attacker tunnels packets recorded at one end of the wormhole to the other (a) n = 300.
(b) n = 1000.
(c) n = 5000. where he replays them in a timely manner. Two common models, long range and short range wormholes [35] , are typically considered. We assert that for both models applied to the DOMCN, an ROC test can be employed to address these issues, so we do not consider them further.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper introduced SIRLoS, a lightweight algorithm for integrated secure network discovery and localization for DOMCNs. To the best of the authors' knowledge, the research presented is the first contribution focused on directional optical link networks for MCN settings. For this reason, we have focused on evaluating foundation performance metrics for directional routing paradigms that would have near-monotonic relations to communications overhead and localization accuracy. These more general performance insights lead to an understanding of fundamental system compromises useful to (a) n = 300.
(c) n = 5000. those who intend to build upon or implement more specific networking protocols for DOMCNs.
Through analysis of SIRLoS we demonstrate, in part, the feasibility of directional communication paradigms at the networking level. In addition, to improved bandwidth, range, interference, power efficiency and security at the physical layer, we demonstrate the feasibility for practical networklevel routing and the security advantages against networklevel routing attacks through analysis of average hop count, localization error and the risk of insider attack. Additional performance and security analysis by the authors can be found in [22] , [25] , [36] , [33] , [12] .
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors thank members of Dr. Kundur's research group at Texas A&M University for lively discussions and insightful ideas. The authors also acknowledge several hours of use on The Texas A&M Supercomputing Facility (http://sc.tamu.edu/ ).
APPENDIX A BIDIRECTIONAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
The likelihood of a bidirectional vulnerability p χA (> 0 ) in a given node s a is equal to p a (the likelihood that χ A compromises s a ) times the probability of s a having one or more bidirectional links; the latter is given by one minus the likelihood it has no bidirectional links. We let Z a be a random variable (r.v.) counting the number of s a 's successors. for n → ∞, where it is employed from spatial point processes [37] Dr. Kundur is the author of over 100 technical publications in the field of information security, multimedia and signal processing and communication systems. Her current research interests include cybersecurity of the electric smart grid, security and privacy of social and sensor networks, multimedia security, and computer forensics. She is an appointed member of the NERC Smart Grid Task Force, an elected member of the IEEE Information Forensics and Security Technical Committee, vice-chair of the Security Interest Group of the IEEE Multimedia Communications Technical Committee and on the editorial boards of the IEEE Transactions on Multimedia, and EURASIP Journal on Information Security.
